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BARTLETT V. UNITED STATES: DEDUCTION OF
NONBUSINESS LOSSES NOT COMPENSATED BY
INSURANCE-THE NEED FOR A SEPARATE STANDARD
FOR INDIVIDUALS
Pursuant to the general rules of section 165(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, a taxpayer may claim as a deduction "any
loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by
insurance or otherwise."' The broad language of this provision has
been the source of considerable litigation primarily aimed at estab-
lishing the amount and year of the deduction in situations compli-
cated by a concurrent insurance claim.2
Another aspect of this section, however, recently has spawned
considerable controversy. In Bartlett v. United States,3 the District
Court for the District of Maryland considered the question of
whether an individual taxpayer who, for personal reasons, elected
not to claim compensation for a nonbusiness loss covered by a valid
insurance policy was eligible for a casualty loss deduction under
subsection 165(c)(3).4 Although recognizing that this exact issue
never had been resolved, the court concluded that the "weight of
available authority" supported the disallowance of the deduction.'
This Comment focuses upon the standard of deduction eligibility
applied in Bartlett and tests its validity in light of the statutory
purpose of subsection 165(c)(3).
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165(a).
2. See Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287 (1945); Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S.
445 (1930); Callan v. Westover, 116 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Broderick v. Anderson, 23
F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Louis Gale, 41 T.C. 269 (1963); Coastal Terminals, Inc., 25
T.C. 1053 (1956).
3. 397 F. Supp. 216 (D. Md. 1975).
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165(c)(3). Subsection 165(c) provides, in pertinent part:
In the case of an individual, the deduction under subsection (a) shall be
limited to-
(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though
not connected with a trade or business; and
(3) losses of property not connected with a trade or business, if such
losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.
A loss described in this paragraph shall be allowed only to the extent that
the amount of loss to such individual arising from each casualty, or from
each theft, exceeds $100 . . ..
5. 397 F. Supp. at 218.
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DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE REVENUE ACT OF 1964
Despite the extensive revision of the Internal Revenue Code in
1954, early decisions construing the sections of the Code dealing
with loss deductions' are of considerable precedential value. Al-
though in the majority of those decisions the courts considered
merely the proper year of deduction, they developed a rationale
applicable to all future constructions.7 Broderick v. Anderson' con-
cerned a bank that had suffered an embezzlement loss in 1929. The
loss was covered by a valid insurance policy, but because the bank
was tardy in filing its claim, the insurance company rejected it in
1930. In disallowing a 1929 deduction, the court reasoned that be-
cause "the loss must be actual and present,"9 the deduction was
proper only in 1930. The court, however, asserted in dicta that
"[n]o force can be given to the plaintiff's claim that 'not compen-
sated by insurance' does not mean 'not covered by insurance'. It
means that or it is meaningless."'
In Callan v. Westover, " an individual businessman claimed a loss
under subsection 23(e) for flood damage to his rental property. In
disallowing the deduction, the court established the following gen-
eral standard of deduction eligibility for losses arising from a busi-
ness related activity: " . . . whether a reasonable taxpayer exercis-
ing ordinary business care and prudence would have treated the
matter as a 'closed and completed' transaction . . . without regard
to possible recoupment in some future year."' 2 The enunciation of
6. Before the major revision of the Code in 1954, the basic income deduction provisions
were amassed under section 23 of the 1939 Code. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 23. The effect of
the 1954 legislation was to separate section 23 into two distinct provisions: subsection 23(a)
dealing with business expense deductions became section 162; subsections 23(e) and 23(f)
dealing with loss deductions became subsections 165(a) and 165(c). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 162, 165(a), (c). The Senate Finance Committee Report that accompanied the legislation
stated: "The general rule for losses of individuals (sec. 23(e)) and the rule for corporations
(sec. 23(f)) become subsections (a) and (c) . . . .No substantive change is made by this
rearrangement. ... S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 198 (1954), in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4833. The revision therefore provided a continuum of statutory authority
that afforded precedential value to early decisions construing subsections 23(e) and 23(f).
7. Cases cited note 2 supra.
8. 23 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
9. Id. at 492.
10. Id. No precedential value has been given to that statement. See note 36 infra & accom-
panying text.
11. 116 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
12. Id. at 198. Previous cases had referred to a test that was practical and flexible enough
to consider all pertinent facts and circumstances. See Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287
(1945); Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930). Callan merely formalized those
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this standard of "ordinary business care and prudence" directly
influenced the decision in 1954 to enact separate provisions for busi-
ness expenses and business losses. 3 Because Congress and the
courts were preoccupied with establishing a valid standard of con-
sideration for corporations and for individuals engaged in business
activities, they failed to clarify the position of an individual suffer-
ing a nonbusiness loss under section 165(c)(3). 14
THE ELECTION NOT To CLAIM INSURANCE COMPENSATION: A
REFINEMENT OF THE GENERAL STANDARD FOR BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
In 1968, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered
several complex tax issues raised by Kentucky Utilities Co. v.
Glenn. '5 The issue pertinent to this discussion concerned a
$44,486.77 deduction claimed by the utilities company on its 1953
corporate tax return for damage done to a generator. In accordance
with the provisions of the 1939 Code, the company wished to claim
the amount as either an ordinary and necessary business expense"1
or as an uninsured loss."7 The generator had been insured by Lloyds
of London for $200,000 subject to a $10,000 deductible clause. The
insurance company never disputed its coverage, but did intend to
subrogate Westinghouse, which had supplied the generator but sub-
sequently had denied any liability under its warranty. The total loss
had been approximately $150,000. Under the settlement among the
criteria within the scope of business activities.
13. "Ordinary business care and prudence" required the taxpayer to maintain his books
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles so that they would clearly reflect
net operating income. The accounting principles demanded that nonrecurring and extraordi-
nary losses or gains be shown separately on the income statement. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 43 (1953). The Senate
Finance Committee endorsed this concept stating: "[a] method of accounting which reflects
the consistent application of generally accepted accounting principles in a trade or business
will ordinarily be considered as clearly reflecting income. These provisions rearrange and
clarify the provisions of the 1939 Code .... " S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954),
in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4939.
14. The courts continued to apply the same basic standard of deduction eligibility to both
business and nonbusiness activities. See Louis Gale, 41 T.C. 269 (1963). Moreover, the con-
cern of Congress that Code provisions must reflect generally accepted accounting principles
expressly exempted individual nonbusiness activities from consideration, but did not give any
definite guidelines for evaluating the reasonableness of those activities in view of proper tax
reporting procedures. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4940.
15. 394 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1968), afig 250 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 23(a).
17. Id. § 23(f).
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three parties, Westinghouse paid $65,550.93 and Lloyds, relinquish-
ing its right of subrogation against Westinghouse, paid $37,500.
Kentucky Utilities was responsible for the remaining $44,486.67,
which it subsequently deducted on its tax return. Excepting the
$10,000 deductible provision, the district court held that because
Kentucky Utilities voluntarily assumed $34,486.67 of the cost of
repairs to the generator to protect Westinghouse from suit by Lloyds
and to avoid difficulty in obtaining insurance with Lloyds, the ex-
penditure of $34,486.67 did not constitute a loss or an ordinary and
necessary business expense.'" Relying on a series of cases concerning
both corporations and individuals engaged in business who volun-
tarily had assumed losses for a variety of business reasons,'" the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
THE REVENUE ACT OF 1964
The 1964 amendment to section 165(c) (3) of the 1954 Code estab-
lished a deduction eligibility standard for nonbusiness losses, pro-
viding a $100 nondeductible "floor" for all personal, nonbusiness
casualty or theft losses. 0 As stated in the Senate report, the purpose
of the amendment was to allow the deduction only of "extraordinary
nonrecurring" losses that might affect significantly an individual's
ability to pay federal income taxes.2' The report further emphasized
that the amendment was applicable only to personal losses as dis-
18. 394 F.2d at 633.
19. Sam P. Wallingford Grain Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 453, 454 (10th Cir. 1934)
(voluntary payment by corporation of debts of predecessor corporation), citing Kornhauser
v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928) (attorney's fees paid in defending partnership suit);
Stephenson v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 348 (8th Cir. 1930) (contributions by officer of a bank
to purchase questioned assets); Mastin v. Commissioner, 28 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1928) (expendi-
tures of stockholder advertising real estate of his corporation).
20. H.R. No. 8363, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 49.
21. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1730. As stated in the Senate report:
[ult is believed appropriate to limit the casualty loss deduction to those losses
or thefts above a minimum amount. The minimum selected was $100 per cas-
ualty loss, since this corresponds approximately with the "$100 deductible"
insurance carried by many individuals in the United States with respect to such
losses. This means that no deduction will be allowed in the case of an ordinary
"fender bending" accident or casualty, but that casualty and theft losses will
continue to be deductible (over the $100) in those cases where they are sufficient
in size to have a significant effect upon an individual's ability to pay federal
income taxes. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1730.
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tinguished from losses involving a trade, business, or transaction for
profit.2"
The unique purpose of this amendment was noted expressly in
Cox v. United States.13 The petitioners had purchased a tract of real
estate as a long term investment. Subsequently, the discovery of an
oil field caused the market value of the land to increase rapidly. Less
than a month later, however, because a massive intrusion of under-
ground salt water destroyed the oil field, the value of the land re-
turned to its former level, inducing the taxpayers to claim a casualty
loss deduction under section 165(c)(3).11 Noting the absence of any
controlling authority, the court "turn[ed] to a consideration of
Congressional intent""5 and concluded that in enacting the casualty
loss deduction (as amended), Congress had intended not to provide
windfalls for the taxpayer, but rather to protect the individual from
extraordinary events that might so weaken his financial status as to
make payment of federal income taxes difficult. 6 Disallowing the
deduction, the court found that the taxpayers in Cox had not suf-
fered any out-of-pocket expenses because they had suffered no loss
from injury to the surface of the land, their only original property
interest, and therefore their ability to pay income taxes was not
impaired. 7
22. Id.
23. 371 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
24. The original profit motive had related only to the surface of the land and thus damage
to the oil field did not come under subsection 165(c)(2). See note 4 supra,
25. 371 F. Supp. at 1260. The court quoted a Supreme Court decision that stated:
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute
than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its
wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the
purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning.
When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has
looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act.
Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd
results but merely an unreasonable one "plainly at variance with the policy of
the legislation as a whole" this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the
literal words. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543
(1940).
26. 371 F. Supp. at 1261. The court quoted from H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963). See note 21 supra & accompanying text. In disallowing the deduction, the court
stated: "[Olne of the fundamental purposes of this deduction was to minimize the financial
hardships of extraordinary losses; it was not intended to be a device for obtaining windfalls."
27. 371 F. Supp. at 1262.
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THE DILEMMA: THE INDIVIDUAL WHO FAILS To CLAIM INSURANCE
COMPENSATION FOR A NONBUSINESS LOSS
After the 1964 amendment to section 165(c)(3), the first case that
considered an individual's personal loss and subsequent election not
to claim insurance compensation was Axelrod v. Commissioner.,'
Storm damage to petitioner's boat had been covered by a valid
insurance policy, but because such insurance was difficult to obtain,
the petitioner had elected to deduct the loss pursuant to section
165(c)(3) rather than to file a claim. Under these circumstances, a
majority of the court refused to decide the validity of the casualty
loss deduction," concluding that the damage to the sailboat was not
even a casualty loss but merely the result of ordinary "wear and
tear."")
Two concurring opinions,' however, expressly addressed the issue
of casualty loss deduction eligibility and took opposing views as to
the validity of such a deduction. In his concurring opinion Judge
Quealy maintained that the issue of deduction eligibility should
have been decided first."2 In reference to the disparity in wording
between section 165(a) 3 (losses not compensated for by insurance)
and the applicable regulation" (losses not made good by insurance)
the opinion stated that these two statements are of the same im-
port. " In addition, Judge Quealy distinguished the case from
Broderick, declining to apply its broad dicta" that "not compen-
sated by insurance" means "not covered by insurance." Rather, he
reasoned that because both Axelrod and Kentucky Utilities in-
28. 56 T.C. 248 (1971).
29. Id. at 256. The court stated: "[Wie do not reach the issue primarily argued by the
parties in their briefs of the proper meaning of the words in section 165(a) 'not compensated
for by insurance or otherwise' . . . . Apparently this issue has never been considered by this
court in factual circumstances comparable to those here present." Id. at 256 n.4.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 259 (Fay, J., concurring); id. at 260 (Quealy, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 260. As stated by Judge Quealy: "[Blefore attempting to decide whether the
petitioner sustained his burden of proof with respect to the facts, we should determine
whether the alleged facts were sufficient to establish a casualty loss." Id.
33. See note 1 supra & accompanying text.
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(a) (1965). The regulation states in pertinent part: "[Slection
165(a) provides that, in computing taxable income under section 63, any loss actually sus-
tained during the taxable year and not made good by insurance or some other form of
compensation ....
35. 56 T.C. at 261.
36. Id. at 263. This was the first time any reported opinion had referred to the Broderick
dicta. See note 10 supra.
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volved taxpayers who failed to file insurance claims to avoid future
difficulty in obtaining insurance, Kentucky Utilities should con-
trol. 7 Under Judge Quealy's analysis, because the petitioner made
a "deliberate" choice not to claim insurance compensation, any loss
so incurred was not a deductible casualty loss, but rather merely a
"disadvantage" resulting from his purely personal choice not to
pursue the right he had."
In an opinion by Judge Fay, however, three judges challenged
that position, responding with a fresh consideration of the issue. 9
Judge Fay attacked the view that the voluntary surrender of a valid
insurance claim always justified disallowing a loss deduction; 0
rather, he contended that because of the realities of the insurance
world, an individual at times could be compelled to waive his insur-
ance rights.' Although he did not note specifically the legislative
intent of section 165(c)(3),11 he reasoned that such a forced waiver
constituted an actual loss.43 The taxpayer, therefore, could validly
claim a loss deduction in that no windfall benefit resulted.4 Because
the lack of individual discretion precluded any voluntary decision,
the practical value of the individual's insurance coverage was ne-
37. Id. at 262.
38. Id. at 263.
39. Id. at 259 (concurring opinion).
40. Id. The opinion dismissed such a view as being "highly artificial and divorced from
reality." Id.
41. Id. at 260. The fear of policy cancellation and prohibitive rate increases was, and still
is, a definite problem in the area of personal automobile insurance. Vanderbeek & Reinmuth,
The Reinsurance Facility: A New Approach to The Residual Auto Insurance Market Problem,
22 DRAKE L. REV. 768 (1973), quoting U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., INSURANCE ACCESSIBILITY FOR
THE HARD-TO-PLACE DRIVER, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION TO THE DEP'T OF
TRANSP. 23 (1970). Although all states have adopted some form of an assigned risk plan for
otherwise uninsurable drivers, the results are not all favorable. For a critique of assigned risk
plans, see id. For an example of an assigned risk plan, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243
(Repl. Vol. 1972).
Moreover, there is no requirement that insurers provide insurance to all those in the "resi-
dual market." The assigned risk plans were designed to eliminate this problem, but "either
by a lack of commitment by the insurers or by the unworkability of the system, the market
was neither ready nor willing to accept 100 per cent of the demand for coverage." Lee &
Formisano, Residual Markets in Automobile Insurance: A Comparative Analysis, 1975 INS.
L.J. 143, 144.
42. 56 T.C. at 259. The language, however, is similar to that used by the Cox court in
stating the purpose of subsection 165(c)(3). See note 26 supra & accompanying text.
43. Id. To buttress his position the judge asserted a due process issue of de facto discrimina-
tion, reasoning that as the loss suffered by one forced to forego insurance benefits was an
actual loss equal to that suffered by an uninsured person, the tax benefit should be the same
in each instance. This issue, however, was dismissed summarily in Bartlett. See note 60 infra.
44. 56 T.C. at 260.
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gated under those circumstances." Judge Fay thus concluded that
the statute contemplated separate consideration of any individual
who, "for valid practical reasons,"4 had been forced to relinquish
his insurance claim.
The deduction eligibility of a taxpayer who elected not to file an
insurance claim constituted the central issue in Bartlett v. United
States.7 In 1971, the petitioner's son had been involved in a single
car accident with the family automobile; the damage sustained to-
taled $1,725.00. Although the damage was covered by a valid insur-
ance policy ($100 deductible), the plaintiffs elected not to claim
reimbursement from the insurance company and on their 1971 tax
return attempted to deduct the damage as a casualty loss under
subsection 165(c)(3). Applying a two-step analysis to the issue of
whether the taxpayer's failure to claim compensation from the in-
surance company barred a subsequent casualty loss deduction, the
court reasoned that: (1) because the taxpayers had voluntarily as-
sumed the expenses, the loss resulted from their decision not to
claim reimbursement and not from a casualty, and (2) any loss
sustained was covered by a valid insurance policy and therefore was
"compensated by the insurance or otherwise."4
Recognizing that this exact issue had not been decided pre-
viously,4" the court nonetheless looked to the "weight of available
authority" and adopted the concurring opinion of Judge Quealy in
Axelrod, 0 subscribing to his view that Kentucky Utilities, in which
the taxpayer was a corporation, should control.5 In arriving at that
decision, however, the court in Bartlett expressly noted that the
purpose of 165(c)(3) was to "cushion the hardship occasioned by
sudden extensive economic losses caused by physical forces outside
of the taxpayer's control,"5 but then distinguished the case under
consideration as a nonhardship situation because the loss arose not
from a casualty but from the taxpayer's deliberate choice not to
collect insurance." The court reasoned that the allowance of a loss
45. Id. See note 41 supra.
46. Id.
47. 397 F. Supp. 216 (D. Md. 1975).
48. Id. at 220.
49. Id. at 218.
50. Id. at 220. See notes 32-38 supra & accompanying text.
51. 56 T.C. at 262. See 397 F. Supp. at 218-20.
52. 397 F. Supp. at 218.
53. Id. In reasoning that the individual had voluntarily assumed the loss, however, the
court concluded that no external circumstances could mitigate the result. But see note 41
supra.
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deduction under circumstances in which the taxpayer voluntarily
assumed the costs of the casualty would, contrary to the design of
the statute, create an optional insurance coverage guaranteed by the
federal government. 4
The determination of what constituted a voluntary action had
been the primary concern of the three-judge concurrence in Axelrod.
In that opinion, Judge Fay, by distinguishing Kentucky Utilities,
implied that a separate standard must be used to determine
whether an individual's action as opposed to a corporation's was
voluntary or merely an involuntary reaction to forces outside his
control."5 Taking judicial notice of the operation of the insurance
market," Judge Fay reasoned that a voluntary decision by a corpo-
ration might be equivalent to an individual's involuntary response
caused by factors beyond his control. 7 The alternative proposed was
a test to measure the extent of an individual's freedom of choice:
Would a reasonable individual, mindful of the realities of the insur-
ance world, consider himself compelled to relinquish his insurance
rights to protect himself from personal hardship?" An insured indi-
54. 397 F. Supp. at 218. There appears to be an inconsistency in this argument. The net
effect of any transaction between the insured and the insurer will not substantially change
the position of the government. If the individual does make a claim against his insurance
company, the amount of that claim will be deducted by the company as an ordinary and
necessary business expense pursuant to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162. In addition, because
of the progressive tax structure, the government actually will realize a net loss compared to
what would have been realized as taxable income if the individual had been allowed to claim
the loss deduction.
55. 56 T.C. 248, 259-60 (Fay, J., concurring). See note 41 supra; notes 77-80 infra & accom-
panying text.
56. 56 T.C. 259. See note 41 supra; notes 77-79 infra & accompanying text.
57. 56 T.C. at 259-60. If a separate standard were adopted by the court, a taxpayer could
argue that an involuntary forfeiture of insurance rights constituted an abandonment of his
claim. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i) (1971) provides, in pertinent part:
If a casualty or other event occurs which may result in a loss . . . no portion
of the loss with respect to which reimbursement may be received is sustained,
for purposes of section 165, until it can be ascertained with reasonable certainty
whether or not such reimbursement will be received. . . . Whether or not such
reimbursement will be received may be ascertained . . . by an abandonment of
the claim. When a taxpayer claims that the taxable year in which a loss is
sustained is fixed by his abandonment of the claim for reimbursement, he must
be able to produce objective evidence of having abandoned the claim, such as
the execution of a release.
The lack of any claim may be construed as objective evidence of having abandoned the claim.
See I.A. Edens, 11 74, 309 P-H Memo T.C. (1974). The claim, under those circumstances,
would be a "worthless" interest thus fulfilling the requirements for an abandonment. See
Commissioner v. McCarthy, 129 F.2d 84, 86 (7th Cir. 1942).
58. Cf. 56 T.C. at 260; note 41 supra.
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vidual confronting that decision was deemed to be in the same
position as an uninsured individual and therefore eligible for the
casualty loss deduction." By rejecting this argument,"0 however, the
Bartlett court rejected any separate standard based on the status
of the taxpayer, and instead designated as appropriate in all cir-
cumstances, the single standard of deduction eligibility applied in
Kentucky Utilities, thus agreeing with Judge Quealy that failure to
file an insurance claim for losses admittedly covered by a valid
insurance policy always precludes any deduction for such losses
under section 165(c)(3). 11
ANALYSIS OF THE "WEIGHT OF AVAILABLE AUTHORITY"
In determining the meaning of "not compensated for by insur-
ance" the primary function of the Court in Bartlett was to ensure
that the interpretative standard used to construe that ambiguous
clause vindicated the statutory purpose of section 165(c)(3).11 Al-
though the court specifically noted the purpose of that section, 3 it
found the provision inapplicable to a taxpayer who voluntarily as-
sumed a loss."4 Such a distinction between voluntary and involun-
tary was unnecessary, however, because the court already had ne-
gated the primary purpose of the casualty loss deduction by apply-
ing to an individual taxpayer suffering a nonbusiness loss the single
standard of Kentucky Utilities, in which a corporate taxpayer sus-
tained a business loss. The court in Bartlett thus was stating in
effect that a "reasonable taxpayer exercising ordinary business care
and prudence" 5 would not have considered the loss to be uninsured;
the authority cited in Kentucky Utilities consisted exclusively of
corporations and individuals who, for business reasons, had as-
sumed voluntarily their respective losses. Yet in 1964 Congress
59. 56 T.C. at 260.
60. 397 F. Supp. at 220. The court in Bartlett also rejected the constitutional issue that
had been raised by Judge Fay in Axelrod. Id. at 221. See note 43 supra.
61. 397 F. Supp. at 220.
62. The Supreme Court has stated: "[A] taxpayer is not obliged to pursue a course of
action giving rise to a greater tax liability if another is open which will give rise to a lesser.
But the question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was
the thing which the statute intended." Gregory v. Helvering, 393 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). See
Zellerebach v. Helvering 293 U.S. 172, 178 (1934).
63. 397 F. Supp. at 218.
64. Id. The term "voluntary" was used to preclude any plea that the taxpayer had aban-
doned his claim. See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1 (d)(2)(i) (1971); But see note 57 supra.
65. 116 F. Supp. 191, 198. See note 12 supra. Contra, note 58 supra & accompanying text.
66. See note 19 supra.
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amended section 165(c)(3) for a specific purpose: to minimize the
financial hardship of extraordinary nonbusiness losses that
otherwise would impair an individual's ability to pay taxes, 7 thus
establishing the nonbusiness individual as a unique classification
requiring separate consideration. This action is significant in that
"[w]hen Congress [chooses] to deal with a particular classifica-
tion in a statutory section, this classification [is] removed from the
application of the general language of the section which would cause
a result contrary to the application of the specific language.""
The focus of Judge Fay's concurrence in Axelrod was that such
separate consideration by Congress mandated that the courts apply
a separate standard to all individuals. Had Judge Fay narrowed the
scope of his argument, rather than including all individual losses,
perhaps the court in Bartlett would have been more receptive to his
opinion. A standard that applies to all individual losses, however,
is too broad for it encompasses both business 9 or profit related'"
activities and nonbusiness activities." Because the separate classifi-
cation created by the 1964 amendment applies only to individual
nonbusiness losses, courts should limit separate consideration to
that category alone. Thus, the proper distinction is not only between
the status of the taxpayer (corporate vs. individual), but also be-
tween the nature of the activities of the individual" (business or
profit related vs. nonbusiness).
Such a distinction is consistent with other provisions of the Code
and treasury regulations.73 A business can deduct its insurance
premiums as an ordinary and necessary business expense74 but per-
sonal insurance premiums are nondeductible. 5 Accordingly, to pre-
clude intentional tax avoidance, a stricter standard of deduction
67. See notes 21-26 supra & accompanying text.
68. 1 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 3.17, at 35 (1974).
69. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165(c)(1).
70. Id. § 165(c)(2).
71. Id. § 165(c)(3).
72. In 1973 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a corporation
may deduct any loss regardless of the nature of the activity. That decision overruled a Tax
Court holding that the loss must come from an activity related to the corporation's trade or
business. International Tracing Co. v. Commissioner, 484 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1973), revg 57
T.C. 455 (1971). Contra, Reis v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 469 (1971). The tax court, in all
probability, only will treat the International Trading Co. decision as precedent within the
Seventh Circuit. Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970).
73. See Tress. Reg. §§ 1.165-7(a)(5), 1.165-7(b)(1), 1.165-7(b)(4)(iv) (1975).
74. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
75. Id. § 262.
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eligibility is necessary for business activities." The validity of a
distinction based both on the taxpayer's status and on the nature
of the taxpayer's activities also is evinced by the relative ability of
businesses and individuals to manage the problem of insurance cov-
erage.7 A business merely treats rate increases as another deducti-
ble business expense with the costs usually absorbed by the con-
sumer; personal policy rate increases, however, represent an out-of-
pocket cost to the individual." Furthermore, if insurance coverage
is cancelled, a business activity often may be in a position to accu-
mulate sufficient assets to provide adequate self-insurance, but few
individuals can afford to do this.
These differences corroborate Judge Fay's contention in Axelrod
that for "valid practical reasons"" an individual may be forced to
relinquish his right to insurance compensation, in other words, that
a voluntary corporate decision might be equivalent to an individ-
ual's involuntary response caused by factors beyond his control.
Moreover, if the scope of his concurrence is restricted to nonbusiness
individual losses, his opinion is consistent with the purpose of sec-
tion 165(c)(3). Because the Kentucky Utilities standard, however,
excludes consideration of differences in taxpayer status and in types
of activities, its application in a situation concerning as in Bartlett
an individual's nonbusiness loss is invalid and could well result in
"unjust and oppressive consequences."'
76. If a business were allowed to deduct the cost of insurance premiums and file a loss
deduction instead of claiming its insurance compensation, the result would lead to tax avoid-
ance on a large scale. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
77. Cf. note 41 supra.
78. The out-of-pocket expense associated with maintaining the value of one's interest was
considered essential to a valid casualty loss deduction in Cox. 371 F. Supp. 1257, 1262.
79. 56 T.C. at 260.
80. The Supreme Court has stated: "[Tlaxation is an intensely practical matter, and the
laws in respect of it should be construed and applied with a view of avoiding, so far as
possible, unjust and oppressive consequences." Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280
U.S. 204, 212 (1930).
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